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of the Community's sugar policy in relation to the ACP-EEC sugar protocol. 
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on this subject. 
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• 
A 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
On the medium and long-term problems of the Community's sugar policy in 
relation to the ACP-EEC sugar protocol of 30 September 1981. 
- having regard to the report of its Committee on Development and Cooperation 
(Doe. 1-456/83) 
- recalling the position taken by the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly on 
implementation of the sugar protocol, in particular the resolutions 
of 3 November 1982 (Rome> and of Luxembourg1 
1 
1. Notes that Community policy on sugar is characterized: 
(a) by market organization based on the production-quota system; 
(b) by a 50 X growth in production between 1969 (Community of 
Six) and 1980 (Community of Nine) and steady growth of exports. 
This has put the Community in a dominant position on the world 
market in sugar· (largest producer, second-largest consumer, second-
largest exporter, with a near monopoly in the export of refined 
sugar) 
(c) by constant improvements in the competitivity of beet sugar over 
cane sugar, mainly as a result of agricultural research activities 
and technological progress; however points out that the Community 
beet producers' high production level is encouraged by guaranteed 
high prices for a large proportion of their production, which makes 
economic comparisons difficult; 
OJ No C39, 10 February 1983 (pp 14 and 15) and 
OJ No C15, 20 January 1982 (pp 16 and 17) 
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(d) by the Community's non-accession to the International Sugar 
Agreement (ISA); 
• 
<e> by the existence of the sugar protocol providing the ACP countries 
with a guarantee of outlets and prices for 1.3 million tonnes of 
cane sugar. 
2. Points out that the world market is characterized by structural 
production surpluses and low prices; notes that the present 
International Sugar Agreement has not helped to remedy this situation 
which is liable to worsen with the development of alternatives to 
sugar, in particular isoglucose; 
3. Takes the view that the Community's present sugar policy represents 
a serious threat of disruption to the world market, and of recession 
to ACP cane-sugar producers; 
4. Notes that by placing its sugar surpluses on the world market, the 
Community causes prices to fall and may ultimately bring about a loss 
of earnings for the ACP possibly well in excess of their revenue 
guaranteed through the sugar protocol. 
5. Recalls that other difficulties encountered in implementing the 
protocol concern: 
the absence of real negotiations on the prices fixed annually; 
- variations and structural growth tendencies of freight charges 
for ACP countries; 
- the effects of inflation and international monetary disruptions; 
- reallocation of quantities not delivered by ACP countries 
pleading fQ!£~-m~i~Yr~; 
- the accession of new ACP States to the protocol. 
6. Notes that the obligations arising from the commercial character of 
the sugar protocol have hitherto been fully respected; 
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7. Points out that the difficulties encountered by the cane-sugar 
refining industry are liable to compromise the 'commercial' 
character of the protocol in the shorter or longer term; 
8. Notes that since the protocol came·into operation, guaranteed (CIF) 
prices for ACP sugar have, with the exception of a single marketing 
year (1975-1976) been higher than world prices; 
9. Stresses that the contraction of the world market in raw sugar to 
the advantage of white sugar is a major obstacle to exports from 
ACP countries; 
10. Stresses the importance of sugar cane growing in the economies of most 
ACP countries that are signatories to the sugar protocol; 
11. Points out that for climatic and geographical, as well as social 
and economic reasons, growing anything to replace sugar-cane 
production would be fraught with the greatest difficulties; 
12. Stresses the responsibility of certain Member States for recent 
developments in the export potential for brown sugar from the ACP 
countries; 
13. Reaffirms its view that there can be no question of holding ACP 
sugar in anyway responsible for the present EEC surpluses in this area; 
14. Believes that implementation of any new Community arrangements for 
sugar based on a system of regulation by prices owuld lead to a 
fall in the Latter, and therefore also to a fall in guaranteed prices 
for ACP sugar, which have already ceased to be remunerative; 
15. Calls on the Community to establish a ceiling for production of beet 
sugar at guaranteed prices which would provide a remunerative price 
to Community and ACP producers and at the same time a reduction in 
the Community beet sugar surplus which would assist the sale of ACP 
sugar on the world market; 
- 7 - PE 80.196/fin. 
16. Considers therefore that a quota system is the only way of 
implementing a ceiling for Community production, through control 
of the A and B quotas, while at the same time maintaining the 
earnings of the sugar-producing ACP countries; 
17. Notes that in the event of partial or total failure by commercial 
operators to purchase quantities of ACP sugar, it will be incumbent 
upon the Community to acquire such quantities at the guaranteed 
intervention price with all the consequences, and particularly 
budgetary consequences, of any such development; 
18. Considers that all proposals for the improvement of the protocol 
based on non-obligation on the ACP to deliver the prescribed 
quantities of sugar to the Community are subject at present to 
serious .objections, such as: 
the ACP countries' difficulties in financing the industrial 
refining capacity required for the exportation of white sugar 
on the world market; 
- the lack of any incentive for the European cane sugar refining 
industry to maintain the sugar protocol if a long-term guarantee 
of regular supplies is not formally given; 
19. Reaffirms that the European Community must continue to honour its 
obligations under the ACP sugar protocol signed on 28 February 1975; 
20. Notes that, despite its limitations, the sugar protocol remains an 
indispensable mechanism for the ACP producer countries but that the 
maintaining of the provisions of the protocol should, however, be 
accompanied by the implementation of auxiliary measures on the part 
of the Community and the ACP States concerned; 
21. In this spirit, calls, in the first instance, on the Community to 
accede to the future international sugar agreement now under 
negotiation; considers that accession is a political and moral 
obligation that the Community and the other countries concerned must 
assume vis-a-vis the developing countries and in particular our 
partners in the Lome Convention; 
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22. Expects accession, in addition to exerting a regulating effect on the 
world market, to impose a ceiling on production, and consequently on 
Community sugar exports; 
23. Supports the idea of a market-sharing scheme guaranteeing sugar-
exporting developing countries a share in the markets of developing-
countries which are sugar importers; 
24. Considers also that the Community must support the efforts of the 
ACP States to diversify their economies so as to supplement their 
cane sugar production; such diversification can result either from 
an extension of the useof by-products of cane sugar, the introduction 
of replacement crops, the establishment of new industries, or a 
combination of these various elements; 
25. This policy should be complemented by agreements concluded by the 
Community with a view to granting free access for ACP export products 
resulting from this policy of diversification, and protecting the 
latter from protectionist measures, and indeed self-limitation 
agreements; 
26. Calls for the implementation at Community level of a policy of 
technical and financial assistance to the sugar-exporting developing 
countries, in particular in the fields of: 
agricultural research to improve cane sugar yields and launch 
replacement crops; 
- research into the packaging and transportation of refined sugar; 
- modernization o1· expansion of refinery and port facilities; 
- training for technical, managerial and marketing staff. 
27. Instructs its Committee on Development and Cooperation and its 
Committee on Agriculture to draw up a report on the evolution of 
substitution products for sugar and the consequences for the 
cultivation of cane and beet sugar. 
28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council 
and to the Commission. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
In its study on the common agricultural policy and the EEC's trade 
relations in the agricultural sector (effects on the developing countries) (1) 
the Commission states: 
'it should be noted that current trends indicate that sugar from ACP 
countries could in the medium-term meet increasingly stiff competition -
both on world and Community markets - from beet sugar and isoglucose' 
(page 56). 
Although this is a cautious statement, it is nevertheless revealing. The 
Commission could have taken refuge behind the Community's contractual 
obligations under the sugar protocol. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation was in fact already well 
aware of the possible risk to ACP sugar. Following the various positions it 
had adopted in the form of opinions for the Committee on Agriculture, and 
following exchanges of views with ACP representatives, notably in the context 
of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee, the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
decided in November 1981 to take up once more the whole question of ACP sugar 
with a view to identifying the medium- and long-term difficulties and trying 
to find solutions. 
I. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SUGAR PROTOCOL 
(a) Background 
The sugar protocol annexed to the Convention of Lome is the offspring of 
another protocol, Protocol No. 22 to the Act of Accession of the United 
<1) July 1982 
NB.: Most of the statistics and technical information are taken from: 
-EEC sugar policy- 1981-1986- Jean TERLINDEN 
European Information Bureau SPRL 
- EUROPE's new sugar policy 
European News Agency 
Marketing and processing of sugar: areas for international cooperation 
Report by the UNCTAD secretariat (1982> 
Kingdom to the Community, in which the six original Member States undertook to 
offer to the developing countries which were signatories to the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement the outlets traditionally guaranteed by the United Kingdom. 
After two years of negotiations this undertaking by the Six led to the 
conclusion of the sugar protocol annexed to the Convention of Lome. 
This protocol is valid for an indefinite period and could not be amended 
until 1981 or denounced until 1982. 
It includes a mutual commitment to purchase and supply agreed quantities 
of ACP sugar (1.3 million tonnes of raw sugar) at guaranteed cif prices 
'negotiated' annually. These negotiations in fact amount merely to a system 
of index-linking ACP prices to Community prices. The total annual quantity 
(1.3 million tonnes) is broken down into individual quantities to be supplied 
by each ACP country which belongs to the sugar protocol. 
The sugar protocol is primarily a trade agreement. ACP sugar is sold on 
the Community market at prices freely negotiated between buyers and sellers. 
The Community's obligation to purchase at the guaranteed price becomes 
operative only if certain quantities of ACP sugar cannot be marketed in the 
Community at a price equivalent to or exceeding the guaranteed price. These 
purchases are made through the intervention agencies of the Community Member 
States. 
(b) Assessment after five years of operation 
Since the sugar protocol entered into force, its commercial purpose has 
been fulfilled. At no point have the Community's intervention agencies been 
obliged to purchase ACP sugar, virtually all of which has been sold to the 
British refinery Tate and Lyle. 
Moreover, the guaranteed prices (cif) and those actually paid have always 
been very much higher than world prices (except in the case of the 1975/76 
marketing year). 
WP0207E 
OR. FR. 
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UA/100 kg of raw sugar 
Marketing year 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
World price 
57.36 (maximum> 
27.39 
16.90 
13.06 
12.21 
Guaranteed price 
25.53 
26.70 
27.25 
27.81 
28.23 
29.69 
32.21 
35.26 
The principal problems which arose during this period of application 
relate to: 
the lack of genuine price negotiations which take account in particular 
of 'all relevant economic factors' (Article 5(4) of the sugar protocol) 
- the increase in the freight costs borne by the ACP States, together with 
inflation which reduces proportionately the annual increases in the 
guaranteed prices <see Annex I) 
-the failure by certain ACP States to fulfil the obligation to deliver 
the agreed quantities, and the question of the re-allocation of these 
quantities 
-in connection with this failure to deliver, the definition of 'force 
majeure' as referred to in Article 7. 
reached in 1978 
An agreement on this point was 
the accession of other ACP States to the sugar protocol without, 
however, increasing the total quantity (1.3 million tonnes) (e.g. Zambia 
and the Ivory Coast) 
WP0207E 
OR. FR. 
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(c) Difficulties facing Tate and Lyle 
Until 1973 (when the United Kingdom joined the Community) two-thirds of 
the sugar consumed by the British came from the Commonwealth countries. This 
raw sugar was refined in the United Kingdom by Tate and Lyle. 
The British Sugar Corporation, a quarter of whose capital is owned by the 
state, produced beet sugar to supply the remaining third needed for internal 
consumption. 
The following table illustrates how the situation has reversed since the 
United Kingdom's accession to the Community. 
United Kingdom sugar balance (1000 tonnes white sugar equivalent) 
Year Production Preferential Imports from Total Consumption 
July-June imports Member States available 
1975/76 641 1,291 315 2,247 2,307 
1976/77 696 1,345 423 2,464 2,420 
1977/78 949 1,246 296 2,491 2,444 
1978/79 1,022 1,129 211 2,362 2,337 
1979/80 1,154 1,186 206 2,546 2,339 
1980/81 1,125 1,130 150 2,405 2,280 
1981/82 1,092 1,116 237 2,445 2,213 
Source: Commission of the EEC 
By 1981 more than SO% of the British sugar market was controlled by the 
British Sugar Corporation, a situation which forced Tate and Lyle to close 
several of its refineries, including the Liverpool refinery in January 1981. 
I The report by the UNCTAD secretariat on the 'Marketing and processing of 
sugar: areas for international cooperation' (1982) states, on this subject: 
'These developments are potentially very serious for the ACP countries. 
Their traditional market is steadily contracting not only on account of lower 
consumption levels, but also, and more particularly, because of the switch to 
WP0207E 
OR.FR. 
- 13 - PE 80.196/ fin. 
beet. Tate and Lyle, their principal refiners, have reduced their refining 
activities and diversified into more Lucrative activities. There are no 
other refineries in the EEC at present capable of taking over from Tate and 
Lyle. If refining margins fall any Lower, the company may be forced to 
contract operations even further. This may Leave the ACP countries without 
•a bridge' for their sugar into the EEC (depending on the role to be played by 
the Portuguese cane sugar refineries). Given that the EEC already has a 
massive surplus of sugar which is expensive to finance, the opportunity can be 
taken, in the Light of these new circumstances, to re-examine the necessity 
for the Sugar Protocol.' 
II. EFFECTS OF THE COMMUNITY'S SUGAR POLICY 
(a) Present situation 
Since 1968 the Community has implemented three 'sugar regulations•. It 
may be said from the outset that the introduction of these various regulations 
has Led to a considerable increase in Community sugar production and has thus 
helped to create a surplus on the world market. 
Between 1968 and 1980 Community production increased by 50% from 8.1 to 
12.2 million tonnes. During this period production in the individual Member 
States rose by 64% in France, 73% in Belgium, and 56% in the FRG, whereas 
sugar-cane production in the Overseas Departments fell by 12.17% over the same 
period (1). 
Reunion 
AntiLLes 
WP0207E 
OR.FR. 
1968 
229,800 
179,484 
409,284 
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1980 
260,748 
92,739 
353,487 
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However, over the same period production in the European countries outside 
the Community (1) increased by 46.2% as compared with the 50% increase in the 
Community, which can therefore not be attributed solely to the mechanisms 
introduced by the various 'sugar regulations'. 
These regulations nevertheless did much to increase the areas under 
cultivation in the Community, which between 1968 and 1980 rose by 25.7% from 
1.4 to 1.7 million hectares, including: 
- + 47% in Denmark 
- + 43.4% in France 
-minus 8% in Italy (2). 
Together with this increase in the area under cultivation, the sub-
stantial progress made by agronomic research led to a considerable improve-
ment in yields and quality. 
TREND IN AVERAGE YIELDS OF SUGAR/HECTARE <x 100 kg.) 
Average 60/61-69/70 Average 70/71-79/80 % 
Italy 42.93 49.21 16.8 
Germany 56.75 61.96 + 9.2 
France 59.24 64.25 + 8.5 
Ireland 48.69 52.80 + 8.4 
Belgium 62.12 65.98 + 6.2 
Nether lands 63.69 66.14 + 3.9 
Denmark 54.73 54.89 + 0.2 
United Kingdom 48.80 46.17 - 5.7 
EEC 56.15 60.22 + 6.6 
<1> e.g. Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
<2> There was a steady decline in the area under cultivation in Italy between 
1967 and 1975 as a result of disputes between sugar planters and 
manufacturers and of competition from other crops. 
WP0207E 
OR.FR. 
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These increases in area under cultivation, yield and, ultimately, 
Community production must be set against the increase in Community 
consumption, which between 1970 and 1980 rose by only 5.3%. 
The Community (of 6) exported 167,000 tonnes <of raw sugar) in 1966, which 
rose steadily to 1.495 million tonnes in 1972, and to over 2 million tonnes in 
1979(1). It should be noted that Tate and Lyle is doing no more than to hold 
on to its traditional markets, i.e., 
- in the Community, Britain and Denmark; 
- outside the Community, the other Scandinavian countries. 
Alongside the growth in productivity in the cultivation of beet, there has 
been a substantial reduction in the number of sugar factories (from 273 in 
1968 to 213 in 1980), which has coincided with an increase in industrial 
productivity and a reduction in costs. Over the period 1970-1980 the major 
production of the Community factories rose from 28,000 to 56,000 tonnes. 
The situation can be summarized as follows: 
The Community is at present 
-the world's major sugar producer 
c. 14% of world production 
-the world's second biggest consumer of sugar 
c. 12% of world production 
- the second biggest exporter 
c. 12 % of world exports 
the major exporter of sugar in the free market 
c. 20% of the market 
- The Community almost has a monopoly of world exports of refined sugar 
c. 70% of exports. 
(1) The principal ACP importers are Nigeria (482,000 tonnes) and the Sudan 
(157,000 tonnes). 
WP0207E 
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(b) The future 'sugar regulation' (after 1986) 
In submitting its proposal on the sugar regulation for the period 
1981-1986 (1) the Commission stated categorically that this was the Last time 
that the quota system would be extended. In its explanatory memorandum the 
Commission says that, pending a future system of control based on prices, it 
is proposing a system based on quotas 'for a limited period, which it regards 
as a transitional system'. It feels that systems which influence production 
principally through prices 'are preferable but they would involve a 
substantial reduction in Community prices in order to control production' 
(point 13 of the explanatory memorandum). 
The future sugar system as envisaged by the Commission would therefore 
have adverse effects on the ACP States which are signatories to the sugar 
protocol. 
The guaranteed price for ACP sugar is 'negotiated annually, within the 
price range obtaining in the Community', so that a fall in the Community price 
will automatically lead to a similar fall in the price of ACP sugar. 
(1) Doe. 1-471/80 
NB.: The situation in Spain and Portugal for the 1979/1980 marketing year was 
as follows: 
WP0207E 
OR. FR. 
Spain 
Portugal 
Production 
1.04 m t 
12,000 tonnes 
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Consumption 
1.1 m t 
335,000 tonnes 
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(c) Cost of the Community's sugar policy 
EAGGF, GUARANTEE SECTION, EXPENDITURE IN THE SUGAR SECTOR 
<million EUA) 
Source: EAGGF 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(a) (1 - 2) Total 
Year Expenditure on Production Net EAGGF EAGGF (3) 
sugar (gross) Levies expenditure Guarantee m 
Section X 
1975 271.2 86 185.2 4,522.5 4 
1976 229.3 133.2 96.1 5,587.1 1.7 
1977 698.4 320.8 377.6 6,830.4 s.s 
1978 878 410.6 467.4 8,672.7 5.4 
1979 939.8 464.9 474.9 10,440.7 4.6 
1980 575.2 247.1 328.1 11,315.2 2.9 
(a) production Levy and Levy for storage costs 
EXPORT REFUNDS IN RELATION TO THE VALUE OF THE SUGAR CONSUMED 
(million EUA) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year Export Total EAGGF (1) EEC sugar Interven- (4)x(5) (1) 
refunds refunds (2) consumption tion price Value of (6) 
on sugar CX) (m t) white sugar/ quantity (%) 
tonne consumed 
1973 56 1,178 4.7 10.4 236 2,454 2.3 
1974 10 619 1.6 9.6 265 2,544 
1975 28 992 2.8 9.5 304 2,888 1 
1976 62 1, 711 3.6 9 331 2,979 2 
1977 409 2,827 14.5 9.5 328 3,116 13 
1978 640 3,750 17 9.5 335 3,182 20 
1979 685 4,982 13.7 9.5 410 3,895 17.6 
1980 396 5,440 7.3 9.5 432 4,104 9.6 
WP0207E 
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This table shows that, although beet accounts for only 2.7% of the total 
value of Community agricultural production, it accounted alone for 10 - 20% of 
total expenditure on export refunds between 1977 and 1979. Expenditure on 
export refunds for sugar is, relatively speaking, higher than for any other 
agricultural product. In his study of the EEC's sugar policy - 1981-1986, Mr 
Jean TERLINDEN states that it is necessary 'to deduct from this refund 
expenditure an amount corresponding to the export refund on a quantity of 
sugar equivalent to that imported on preferential terms ••• •. 
Should the refunds connected with ACP sugar in fact be deducted? It has 
already been pointed out that ACP sugar has hitherto always been imported on a 
commercial basis. These imports are linked to a refinery infrastructure 
already existing in the Community. To want to deduct ACP sugar from the 
refunds is tantamount to saying that without the sugar protocol this 
infrastructure would automatically have ceased to exist. 
Ambassador JACKMAN, chairman of the ACP Subcommittee on Sugar stated on 
18 September 1981: 'In this connection I must draw attention once again to 
the objections raised in the ACP countries by the Community practice, which 
could be described as 'idiosyncratic', of presenting its budget in such a way 
that, to the layman the Community appears to have entered into an obligation 
equivalent to providing aid for the export of 1.3 million tonnes of sugar, and 
of showing this fictitious expenditure to be attributable to imports of ACP 
sugar. The fact is, of course, that sugar imports into the Community have not 
increased since the entry into force of the protocol and that there is no 
calculation which indicates that the ACP countries can be held responsible for 
the sugar surpluses in the Community and hence for the cost of aid to export 
of these surpluses'. 
The current sugar regime (1981-1986) is mainly distinguished, apart from 
changes to the quota system, by the fact that the producers are fully 
responsible for the cost of disposing of surpluses <eo-responsibility Levy). 
According to the Commission, this new regime has already produced 
results, since there was a reduction of 9.1% in the area under cultivation in 
1982. It is estimated that there will be a reduction of between 5 and 10% in 
1983. 
WP0207E 
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In the report already quoted, the UNCTAD secretariat appears to be less 
optimistic, observing: 
'It is obviously too early to tell whether the new sugar regime will be more 
successful than earlier ones in curtailing production and reorienting it in 
keeping with the market. However, there are at least two points which can be 
made at this stage. Firstly, the new regime does not appear to impose any 
real limit on the amount of sugar to be produced within the Community, prices 
to be paid or the amount of funds for subsidizing export rebates. The 
effects of the 2 per cent eo-responsibility levy have in fact been offset by 
the 8.5 per cent increase in the intervention price for raw sugar in 1981/82.' 
To sum up, the Community's sugar policy has led to: 
a rise in the Community's sugar production of approximately SOX between 
1968/1969 and 1979/1980, as a result of a 25% increase in acreage and a 
25% increase in yields; 
increased amounts available for export; 
increased budgetary appropriations for the sugar regime by the Community 
<at least until 1980), including export refunds and contributions to 
storage costs; 
increased problems in connection with ACP sugar imports; 
increased problems with other exporters in terms of competition on world 
markets, such that the exports by the EEC have been seen as contributing 
to world instability and falling sugar prices to the detriment of many 
developing country exporters. 
WP0207E 
OR. FR. 
20 - PE 80.196/ fin. 
III. ISOGLUCOSE 
Isoglucose is a Liquid sweetener of which LOO kg corresponds to around 
71 kg of white sugar. It is manufactured from starch <L> obtained either from 
maize, wheat or potatoes. 
In the Community isoglucose is manufactured principally from maize and, 
because there is a shortfall in Community production, 50X of maize 
requirements have to be imported. 
Despite the restrictive Community rules <twice annulled by the Court of 
Justice>, isoglucose production has developed rapidly, increasing from 82,593 
tonnes (dry matter) in 1976/77 to 164,217 tonnes in 1979/80. 
Compared with the United States, however, these figures are very low. 
Per capita consumption of isoglucose alone rose in the United States from 0.32 
kg in 1970 to 8.57 kg in 1980. Consumption of all maize-based sweeteners 
totalled 3.75 million tonnes, 29X of total sugar consumption, in 1980, and 37X 
of total sugar consumption in 1981. In the near future, and if a majority of 
the United States soda manufacturers (2) follow the example of Coca-Cola and 
replace half the quantity of sugar used by sweeteners, 900,000 tonnes of sugar 
will be replaced by isoglucose. The reduction in United States sugar imports 
would have serious consequences for the supplier countries, including ACP 
countries in the Caribbean <Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago). 
In the Community, the latest sugar regulation, which entered into force 
on 30 June 1981, for the first time includes isoglucose. This product is now 
subject to a system of quotas which, for the two types A and B, total 
l98,085 tonnes (3). 
<1> The 'direct hydrolysis' manufacturing process enables glucose to be 
obtained from groats and maize meal without the starch stage. 
<2> This industry alone accounts for 24X of total sugar consumption in the 
United States. 
(3) Including Greece 
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IV. WORLD MARKET 
INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT (ISA) 
(a) Production 
The following table shows world production broken down by region for the 
marketing years from 1977/78 to 1980/81 
(1000 tonnes raw sugar equivalent) 
Region 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 
Europe 30,464 30,180 29,298 28,083 
EEC 12,538 12,645 13,277 12,991 
Western Europe 16,587 16,437 16,985 16,665 
Eastern Europe 13,877 13,743 12,313 11,418 
Central America 
and North America 19,419 20,381 18,134 17,684 
South America 13,267 12,636 12,381 13,602 
Africa 6,553 6,504 6,610 6,545 
Asia 18,118 17,936 14,977 17,211 
Oceania 3,437 3,518 3,586 3,855 
WORLD TOTAL 91,078 91,155 84,986 86,980 
The principal producers in order of importance are the EEC, Brazil, the 
USSR, Cuba, India, the United States, Australia and China. Together their 
production accounts for approximately 60% of world production. 
Total production in Africa amounts on average to 6.5 million tonnes of 
raw sugar. 
The trend in world production follows a 'price-investment' cycle, whose 
duration corresponds roughly to that of cane, that is, seven years. 
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(b) World consumption 
World consumption rose from 64.4 million tonnes in 1967/68 to 89.6 
million tonnes in 1980/81 (1). Consumption is stable in the industrialized 
countries but is increasing in the developing counries by an average of 5% a 
year, although this is clearly influenced by the fluctuations in, and 
development of incomes in these countries. 
(c) World trade 
Over the Last ten years the developing countries• share in gross exports 
of raw sugar has totalled around 65%. The biggest exporters of raw sugar are, 
in order of importance: 
- Cuba 
-Brazil 
-Philippines 
- Dominican Republic 
- Argentina 
Among the industrialized countries: 
- EEC <white sugar) 
- Australia (raw sugar) 
- South Africa (raw sugar) 
m tonnes per year 
approximately 5.9 
11 2.3 
11 L. 4 
11 
11 
0.9 
0.8 
4.L 
2.5 
1.0 
Taking all countries together, the EEC is, after Cuba, the biggest net 
exporter of sugar on the world market. Deducting preferential imports, the 
EEC's net exports for the marketing year 79/80 amounted to 2.8 m tonnes of 
white sugar as compared with Brazil's 2.5 m tonnes of raw sugar and 
Australia's 2.4 tonnes of raw sugar. 
(1) Compared to world production of 86.9 million tonnes and stocks of 
31.3 million tonnes. 
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The trend in the Community's exports has provoked, and continues to 
provoke, reactions from certain exporting countries such as Brazil and 
Australia. They have brought up the problem in GATT, since they feel that, 
through its export refund policy, the Community is distorting the world market 
and gaining too great a share of this market <see para. on ISA, below>. 
The industrialized countries account for around 63X of gross imports, 
including: 
1979/80 
- USSR 5.0 m t of raw sugar 
- United States 4.7" " " " 
- Japan 2.1 " " " " 
- China 1· 2 " " " " 
(d) Features of the world market 
The sugar trade is conducted in accordance with a number of different 
systems which in fact boil down to two. The first is a controlled market 
system, under which trade is regulated by the public authorities and is 
conducted in the framework of a series of bilateral deals and special 
agreements between the governments of the importing and exporting countries 
(ACP-EEC Sugar Protocol, Cuba agreement, Comecon, etc.>. The second is the 
free market system, which accounts for between 70 and 75X of all dealings in 
sugar. This market is, however, regarded as 'residual' because it only 
covers sugar which is not consumed in the producer countries or is not subject 
to preferential arrangements, i.e. some 16X of world production (about 15 m 
tonnes). 
It is not possible to state how many bilateral agreements on long-term 
contracts are in force, since their existence is not always made public. The 
number of such agreements has tended to rise since 1974, however. The 
details of the special agreements in force between Cuba and the Soviet Union 
or the other socialist countries are not made public. 
Analysing the situation over a Long period, it can be seen that, eight 
years out of ten, the world market is characterized by structural surpluses 
and Low prices. 
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Moreover, world stocks have risen sharply, from an estimated 16.9 m tonnes 
in 1972 to 31.3 m tonnes in 1980, or roughly 35% of annual world consumption. 
(e) International Sugar Agreement (!SA) 
The first international sugar agreement dates back to 1964, since when the 
system has undergone several profound changes through successive re-negotia-
tions. The objective is still the same, however: to estabLish a system 
which, through control of the market, enables sugar prices to be stabilized at 
a 'fair' level. 
The existing !SA entered into force on l January 1978 for a period of five 
years, which was extended to 1984. Unlike the other major exporting countries 
<Cuba, Australia and Brazil) the Community did not accede to this !SA or to 
the previous agreements. Moreover, six ACP States are party to the !SA. (l) 
Like the previous agreements the 1978 ISA comprises a system of export 
quotas adapted to: 
- the world market price 
the buffer stocks established or relased in accordance with the market 
situation. 
These mechanisms are intended to maintain the price of sugar within a 
bracket of 13 to 23 US cents per pound fob, Caribbean ports. 
In fact, the annual average price during the period of application of the 
!SA has been: 
7.82 US cents in 1978 
9.65 US cents in 1979 
28.69 US cents in 1980 
These figures clearly reveal the failure of the !SA, which certain 
countries consider is partly attributable to the non-participation of the EEC. 
(1) Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius and Swaziland. 
Non-members are: Barbados, Belize, Surinam, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Uganda, Congo and Tanzania. 
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In the study already referred to Mr J. TERLINDEN states: 'Certain people 
have hastened to point out that, by remaining outside the ISA, the Community 
has benefited from its advantages and evaded its restrictions: 
-the restrictions applied by the members of ISA (2.6 million tonnes) 
left room on the world market for the expansion of European exports; 
- it has been estimated that, in 1979, each time the world market price 
rose by one point EAGGF support expenditure fell by 5%; 
-while other exporting countries (such as Austrialia, South America and 
the Philippines) have been obliged to cut production, the EEC has been 
able to increase its production'. 
The Community's policy on sugar exports was accused of exercising a 
destabilizing influence and damaging the interests of other exporters. 
Australia and Brazil brought proceedings against the Community within GATT. 
In March 1982, the GATT Council decided to abandon its consideration of 
this action, since the amendments made to the Community sugar regime had 
removed all elements of subsidy. A week later, 10 countries (Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, India, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines and 
the Dominican Republic) brought another action against Community export 
subsidies for sugar. 
V. WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR ACP SUGAR? 
Under these circumstances- primarily, merciless competition from beet 
sugar (and isoglucose) in a market with a structural surplus - does ACP cane 
sugar still, in economic terms, stand a chance? To answer this question it is 
necessary to examine the importance of cane sugar in the economies of the ACP 
countries and to reiterate the responsibility which the Community and the 
Member States must bear for the development of cane sugar production in the 
ACP countries. 
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To illustrate the importance of the cane sugar sector in the economies 
of certain ACP countries, in addition to these figures it is necessary 
to indicate the percentage share of raw sugar exports in total exports. 
For example, in 1978 this percentage was 
- 65.4X for t~ Island of Mauritius 
( = $ 211.6 m> 
- 51.4% for Fiji 
( = $ 103.6 m > 
- 37.2X for Swaziland (for 1977) 
( = $ 61.2 m) 
- 35.1 X for Guyana 
< = $ 103.8 m> 
- 18% for Barbados 
( = $ 23.3 m) 
- The vital importance of this sector is increased by certain features of 
the cultivation of sugar-cane. This crop is frequently the only one 
suited to the restrictions imposed by climate, soil composition and 
terrain. There is therefore a tendency towards single-crop farming 
which increases the dependence of the economy on the sugar market. 
Moreover, any conversion programme, even if it were possible, comes up 
against the constraints of the sugar-cane cycle, around seven years, 
and the farmers' way of life. Finally, since it requires a large 
labour force in view of the scant possibilities for mechanization <too 
small an area under cultivation, the nature of the terrain, etc.> the 
cultivation of sugar-cane plays an important economic and social rule, 
even though the cost is substantially increased by the wages bill. 
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This means that for countries such as Fiji, the Island of Mauritius or 
Guyana, for example, the development of their agriculture and 
agricultural processing industry is dependent on an expansion in 
sugar-cane cultivation. 
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(b) Responsibility of the Community and the Member States for the 
development of ACP cane sugar production 
In a communication to the Council of 1978 <1> the Commission questioned: 
'whether the Community could continue to turn a blind eye to the fact that 
indiscriminate, though understandable, export aid policies are manifestly at 
odds with the responsibility incumbent upon these States and the Community 
towards their trading partners in the Third World, particularly with regard to 
the choice of industries, and activities most suitable for development'. 
This was the conclusion, expressed in the form of an appeal, to an 
analysis of the trend in current or proposed investment in the ACP States' 
sugar sector. According to this analysis (published at the beginning of 1979>: 
- the production of sugar in the ACP States which would have to be 
exported would reach 2.9 million tonnes in 1981 as compared with 2 
million at that time; 
- two thirds of the current or proposed projects in the ACP States 
receive financial support and technical assistance from Community firms 
and agencies which are generally backed up by public guarantees and 
interest rebates. The activities of these Community agencies involve 
promotion, engineering, project management and the provision of 
equipment on credit. 
The Commission pointed out that this trend occurred at a time when the 
world market showed a serious structural surplus. At current price 
Levels, the Commission added, no new projects could be guaranteed 
profitability. 
<1> Lack of proper coordination between the policies of the Community and the 
Member States - the case of sugar - COM(78) 623 final PE 56.847 
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- Even if the estimated increase in sugar production in the ACP States 
has been only partially realized (1), this does not remove the lack of 
coordination between these policies and the resulting responsibility 
which must be borne by the Member States and the Community. 
In order to correct this situation the Commission proposed the 
introduction of 'in-depth coordinative consultation' on all action 
taken or envisaged in the sugar sector by Community firms with the 
active and systematic support of Member States. It would be 
interesting to know to what extent this proposal has been followed up. 
<c> Are there alternatives to the sugar protocol? 
Given that the world market situation is characterized by structural 
surpluses and the steady increase in the profitability of beet sugar, together 
with the expansion of sweetener production, the competitiveness of sugar cane 
would appear to be doomed in the long term. However, this purely economic 
fact is politically unacceptable, chiefly for the reasons just mentioned 
(importance of sugar cane for the economies of certain developing countries; 
responsibility of the industrialized countries for the introduction and 
development of this crop). 
Moreover, the terms in which the problem is currently being presented 
contain a number of contradictions. 
For example, the Community claims that it can only reduce its beet sugar 
production by introducing a system of market regulation by means of prices; 
such a system would lead to a reduction in the price of Community sugar, and 
hence also a reduction in the guaranteed price for ACP sugar. On the other 
hand, raising the guaranteed price encourages the production of Community 
sugar, but also benefits ACP sugar. Finally, if the Community were to sign 
the ISA, as the developing countries in particular are urging it to do, the 
result would be, because of the mechanisms of the agreement, a reduction in 
the Community price, and hence also in the guaranteed price for ACP sugar. 
(1) For example : 
Tonnes of raw sugar available for export: 
1978 
IVORY COAST 
SWAZILAND : 
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1981 
60,000 t. 
310,000 t. 
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Is it possible to eliminate these contradictions and achieve 'peaceful 
coexistence' between beet sugar and cane sugar? 
Will the implementation of the sugar protocol alone be enough to remove 
the threat to ACP sugar? 
The limits and shortcomings of the sugar protocol 
Our committee, the European Parliament as a whole and the ACP-EEC 
Consultative Assembly have stressed on many occasions the irrevocable nature 
of the commitment undertaken by the Community in signing the sugar protocol. 
All those who have expressed a view on the matter have emphasized the 
political content of this commitment and hence the 'political' nature of the 
price of cane sugar. 
However, this does not prevent us from going beyond ritual pronouncements 
of this kind and considering realistically the content and possible changes to 
the sugar protocol. 
WP0207E 
OR. FR. 
In comparison with the present situation, the application of this 
protocol can offer only limited progress for those ACP countries which 
produce sugar cane. Apart from cases involving the reallocation of 
quotas, the accession of other countries to the protocol and greater 
involvement of the ACP countries concerned in the negotiations on 
Community prices on which the guaranteed prices are based, the sugar 
protocol cannot lead to any substantial changes in the situation of 
those ACP countries which produce sugar cane. 
During the negotiations on the guaranteed prices for ACP sugar for 
1982-1983, the ACP countries which produce sugar cane stressed once 
again that, in real terms, these prices had been falling steadily for 
six years. They claimed that, during this period, the guaranteed price 
rose by 26% while costs had increased by over 150%. 
As the guaranteed price for ACP sugar is directly dependent on the 
guaranteed Community price, the only way to modify this trend would be 
to amend the protocol to make the basis for the ACP's guaranteed price 
fob instead of cif. The cost of shipping, which is currently met by 
the ACP, would thus no longer affect the price paid to the latter, 
which would therefore once again be in a more favourable position than 
European beet sugar producers. 
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However, there is little chance of such an amendment to the sugar 
protocol being introduced. At present the Community is only prepared 
to undertake studies into the possibilities of reducing the cost of 
shipping to the ACP countries. By May 1938 the result of such studies 
was known to be negative. 
- The guaranteed price for ACP sugar, which is not very profitable at 
present, could become even less interesting if, as already indicated, 
the Community were to abandon the system of regulating the market by 
means of quotas in favour of regulation by prices. Moreover, 
-a system of this kind in the Community would benefit large farms at the 
expense of small or medium-sized concerns. If the latter disappeared 
from the market, the average production cost of beet sugar would fall 
at the same time as that of sugar cane were increasing as a result of 
improvements in social security arrangements and wages. At the end of 
this process, the guaranteed price for ACP sugar would cover an ever 
diminishing proportion of production costs. 
- The Community would thus have safeguarded the irrevocable nature of the 
sugar protocol but deprived it of its substance and hence its value to 
the ACP countries. 
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Other possible developments which would not render the sugar protocol 
inoperative but would call its very existence into question must be 
reckoned with. For instance, if Tate and Lyle (a firm which faces 
direct competition from beet sugar and isoglucose) were to stop 
purchasing sugar cane, the Community would have to buy up the fixed 
quantities under the protocol at the guaranteed intervention price. 
The resulting financial burden might lead certain influential lobbies 
to call for the abolition of the sugar protocol. 
These few examples are mainly intended to show that it is not enough 
just to stress the irrevocable nature of the commitments entered into 
by the Community by virtue of the sugar protocol. The Community and 
the ACP countries must start to anticipate such developments now so 
that they will be able to mitigate their impact. 
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Abolition of the obligation to deliver? 
According to some experts, the expected trend of the Community and world 
sugar markets requires the sugar protocol to be revised by the abolition of 
the obligation on ACP countries to deliver specified quantities of cane sugar 
to the Community. These experts base their argument on the fact that the 
obligation on the Community to import 1.3 m tonnes of sugar to be re-exported 
at a later date does not make sense in economic terms. Each tonne of sugar 
involved costs the Community: 
the difference between the guaranteed price and the world price plus 
export refunds. 
It has therefore been suggested that the obligation on the ACP countries 
to deliver the above quantity should be abolished and that the Community 
should merely pay the difference between the world price and the guaranteed 
price in respect of fixed quotas. A system of this kind would result in 
savings on export refunds. 
In this connection, Jean TERLINDEN writes in his study of the Community's 
sugar policy from 1981-1986 referred to above: Considerable savings would 
also be made on storage and transport costs, particularly as the Community 
imports cane sugar from the ACP countries on the one hand and, on the other, 
exports its surplus refined sugar to neighbouring countries in the same 
areas. For example, the Community imports 100,000 tonnes of sugar from Fiji 
every year and exports about 30,000 tonnes to Papua-new Guinea. This 
convoluted procedure could be avoided if the latter were to import sugar 
directly from Fiji. 
The idea of abolishing the delivery obligation could be presented to the 
ACP countries as an alternative to the present system. Preferential import 
arrangements could thus act as a safety net if the ACP countries were unable 
to find outlets on the world markets. 
If, on the other hand, the ACP countries found buyers for their sugar, 
the Community would pay the difference between the price of cane on the world 
market and the guaranteed price in respect of the agreed quotas. For the ACP 
States, this solution would have the advantage of meeting one of their 
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repeated demands, namely, that the guaranteed price should be ex-factory and 
not cif at a European port; they would no Longer have to deduct from their 
revenue the cost of transporting sugar to European ports, as the Community 
would intervene Locally. 
Another solution could be adopted to guarantee a market for ACP sugar for 
which no buyer could be found on the world market. This sugar would not be 
imported into Europe but would instead be used as food aid and sent directly 
to regions where it was required. 
Even under the present system this solution would result in savings to 
the Community budget. 
When the export refund is higher than the world market price of sugar, as 
was the case in 1977-78 and 1978-79, this option becomes even more 
attractive. This would be the case whenever the Community intervention price 
was more than twice the world price, with the result that, paradoxically, it 
would be Less expensive to give away the sugar than to sell it at a price 
which would not even cover the export refund necessary to dispose of it on the 
world market. 
This idea was also evident in the Community's agreement with Zimbabwe, as 
the Latter was guaranteed a market or payment for 25,000 tonnes of white sugar 
- either within the quotas not used by the other ACP countries, 
- or, if this does not cover all or part of the quantity concerned, as a 
Local purchase to be used with no obligation to export to the Community. 
These various solutions may appear attractive. However, they ignore 
several aspects of the problem. 
Firstly, as explained at the beginning of this report, the system 
established in the sugar protocol results directly from Tate and Lyle's 
concern to secure guaranteed supplies for its cane sugar refineries. If the 
obligation to deliver certain quantities was abolished, Tate and Lyle would no 
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longer have any interest in the sugar protocol being maintained. Is there not 
a risk then that, instead of the protocol merely being amended, it might be 
scrapped altogether? 
Furthermore, solutions involving the cessation of deliveries to the 
Community fall down on one very important point: the refining and storage 
faci_Lities of the developing countries in general, and the ACP countries in 
particular. On this subject, the report by the UNClAD secretariat noted 
that, because of market trends (discouraging prospects for raw sugar, very 
healthy demand for white sugar, competition from white beet sugar), 
sugar-exporting developing countries were in a dilemma, since: 
-their outlets for raw sugar are decreasing, but 
- the price fetched by white sugar is too low to cover the costs of refining 
raw sugar. 
Apart from Brazil, India, Cuba, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines 
and Thailand, the other sugar-exporting developing countries' refining 
industries are capable, at best, only of meeting domestic needs and not of 
catering for exports. Although there are admittedly no obvious technological 
or structural problems to be overcome, there are nevertheless two other 
obstacles to the refining of the sugar in question: 
the need for large investments to achieve a small margin of added value, 
and 
- the increased need for, and cost of, storage and transport. 
With reference to investment costs, certain major trends can be 
identified. Over the last ten years, the FOB cost of new refineries has 
risen from £1,500 to £7,000 per tonne of sugar cane and per day. In 
Africa, the rise in the average cost of sugar refinery with a basic capacity 
of 2,000 tonnes has been: 
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Finally, it should be recalled that, in general, the costs of storage and 
transport are much higher for refined sugar than for raw sugar. This is due 
to hygiene requirements, particularly in damp climates, and to the fact that 
the mechanization of Loading operations is much Less advanced than in the case 
of raw sugar. 
Finally, your rapporteur considers that the amendments to the protocol 
suggested in certain quarters do not amount to a realistic solution for the 
ACP countries concerned. In spite of its weaknesses and deficiencies, the 
sugar protocol continues to be necessary in its present form. An improvement 
in the situation of the ACP sugar-producers will have to be achieved, instead, 
by measures accompanying the protocol. 
(d) Accompanying measures to the sugar protocol 
The Community and the new international sugar agreement 
While the accession of the Community to the future international 
sugar agreement would certainly not solve all the problems, your 
rapporteur nevertheless feels that it is a political and moral 
obligation which the Community must respect if it wishes to retain 
its credibility vis-a-vis its trading partners and, more 
particularly, in the eyes of the developing countries. 
The weaknesses and deficiencies of the present international sugar 
agreement, to which the Community is not a party, were described in 
a previous chapter. It was also pointed out that these 
shortcomings resulted partly from the Community's failure to 
participate in the agreement. 
Up to now the Community has always stated its readiness to accede to an 
international sugar agreement which took account, in particular, of trends in 
prices, consumption, production and the sales and stocks of alternative 
sweeteners. 
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In March 1983, the Council of the European Community adopted a common 
position for the negotiation on the new ISA scheduled for the beginning of May 
1983. The Community proposes that this new agreement, which should enter 
into force at the beginning of 1984, be based on a system of stocks, and no 
Longer on a system of export quotas. The principal exporting countries 
(South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the EEC, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, India, Philippines and Thailand) and importing countries (USA, Japan 
and Canada) should establish national stocks which would be coordinated by the 
international sugar organization. Finally, according to the Community 
proposals, medium-size producers would be granted export quotas and small 
producers <with Less than 70,000 tonnes annual exports) could sell freely up 
to this ceiling. 
Your rapporteur considers that, in addition to its impact in terms of 
regulating the world market, the Community's accession to the international 
sugar agreement must also be seen as a partial solution to the problem of 
those developing countries which produce cane sugar. It should Lead to a 
fall in Community sugar exports. Commissioner PISANI pointed out during the 
recent meeting of the Joint Committee in Rome (1-3 November 1982) that, 
although the Community could, without too much difficulty, replace its beet 
crop with other crops in which it is not self-sufficient, the same was not 
true for the sugar-cane producing developing countries because of the 
climatic, pedological, social and economic factors already discussed. 
Before asking the developing countries and the ACP in particular to make 
changes in their economies, the Community should set an example by fixing a 
ceiling for its beet sugar production <which increased by 50% between 1968 and 
1980) and acceding to the international sugar agreement. 
Community aid for the diversification of the economy of ACP countries which 
produce cane sugar 
Apart from the problem of Tate and Lyle, the underlying conception of the 
sugar protocol is related directly to the economic structure of the ACP States 
most concerned, namely (apart from Swaziland and Mauritius), the countries of 
the Caribbean and the Pacific, where the main economic activity is sugar cane 
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production. Consequently, the provisions of the sugar protocol (quantity and 
price guarantees) inevitably have a major impact on their trade balance. 
In addition to applying the sugar protocol, these countries should be 
encouraged to make changes in the structure of their economies to decrease 
their dependence on cane sugar. At the same time as fixing a ceiling for its 
beet sugar production, the Community should undertake to help the countries 
concerned to diversify their economies by: 
providing the ACP countries with technological and financial assistance 
in order to help them make full use of sugar cane by increasing value 
added on the spot (energy products, cellulose, sucro-chemical products, 
fodder, etc.>; 
promoting alternative crops; 
promoting the establishment of new industries. 
Furthermore, the Community's commitment should not be restricted to aid to 
diversify these countries' economies. The example of Mauritius is illumi-
nating in this respect. 
After Mauritius had started to diversify its economy by establishing 
textile industries, it was forced to accept a voluntary restraint agreement in 
respect of its exports to the Community. Even though the situation of the 
Caribbean ACP countries is different because there is a potential regional 
market, the fact remains that if the economies of sugar-producing ACP 
countries are to be diversified, export outlets must be found on the markets 
of the industrialized countries. If an ACP State which has acceded to the 
sugar protocol adopts a policy of diversification, the Community should enter 
into specific and firm commitments: 
- of a financial nature to support the policy of diversification; 
- of a commercial nature to guarantee the country concerned access to its 
market. 
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Without wishing at this stage to discuss the details of commercial 
undertakings of this kind, it is clear that, in such cases, the safeguard 
clause provided for in the agreement should not be applied. At the very least 
it should be specified that any restrictive trade practice would be 'erga 
omnes' so that it would be virtually impossible to apply such a clause in 
practice. 
Sharing the markets 
The report of the UNCTAD secretariat mentions, among its proposals for 
concerted international action, a market-sharing or 'limit' arrangement 
guaranteeing the developing countries a steady or increasing share of the 
sugar markets of non-sugar producing developing countries. In an arrangement 
of this type, the importing developing countries would ensure that a 
proportion of their imports were supplied by developing country producers, 
and/or the exporting developed countries would limit their sales to such 
countries to a certain proportion of the demand, thus exercising a certain 
degree of self-restraint in competing with other exporting countries. 
Such a policy presupposes, however, that the cane sugar exporting 
developing countries have adequate refining facilities at their disposal. 
The guarantee of certain outlets could encourage them to acquire such 
facilities, despite the heavy investment required. If necessary, 
particularly in the case of small exporting developing countries, whose 
refining industries could not rely on a sufficiently large domestic market, 
consideration should be given to setting up refineries at regional level. 
Technical and financial assistance 
There are many opportunities for the international community, and hence 
the European Community, to provide technical and financial assistance to 
developing countries which export cane sugar. The most important areas to 
which this technical and financial assistance should be directed are: 
agronomic research to improve cane sugar yields, and to develop 
substitute crops; 
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research on the processing and transport of refined sugar; 
the modernization or extension of refining and port facilities; 
training the necessary staff (technical, management, and sales). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of the sugar market is certainly one of the most difficult 
and sensitive we have to face. Throughout this report, your rapporteur has 
emphasized the large number of conflicts between the interests of ACP 
producers and the Community's policy on sugar. He does not claim that these 
few proposals for future action will resolve these conflicts of interest. As 
the UNCTAD document states, it would be difficult to find a more striking 
example of the conflict resulting from colonialism's creation of monocultural 
countries and the practical consequences of current policies. 
In concluding this attempted analysis of the medium and long-term 
problems of the Community's and the ACP countries' policies on sugar, your 
rapporteur considers that the sugar protocol continues to be an indispensable 
instrument for the ACP countries, even though it is not in itself an adequate 
one. It is indispensable because the ACP countries will continue to need, 
for a very Long time to come, guaranteed outlets and prices for their sugar 
cane. Because of its political commitments and responsibilities, the 
Community must maintain and indeed improve these guarantees. But the 
protocol is inadequate because it does not enable the ACP countries to obtain 
a profitable price; moreover, it contains neither the means to guarantee its 
own survival nor provisions to ensure 'peaceful coexistence• on world and 
Community markets between cane and beet sugar. 
A number of suggested accompanying measures to the protocol have been 
outlined, with Community accession to the next ISA as a priority. This List 
of accompanying measures is far from exhaustive, and both the Commission and 
the ACP countries which are party to the protocol are requested to join in the 
quest for medium-term and Long-term solutions to the problem. The objective 
of any such solutions is to make the sugar protocol a more integral part of 
the Community's sugar policy, while providing the ACP countries concerned with 
technical and financial aid, in the context of cooperation and development 
policy, to help them overcome their problems. 
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ANNEX I 
NOMINAL COSTS OF FREIGHT AND INSURANCE 
1972 - 1980 
Daily London Nominal costs <2> as a Price paid <2> as a 
Year c.i.f. price, of freight percentage for sugar percentage bulk ship- and insurance of <1 > from ACP of <4> 
ments to UK countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1972 72.63 4.33 5.9 
1973 99.46 10.16 10.2 
1974 305.13 16.87 5.5 
1975 216.47 9.26 4.3 210.44 4.4 
1976 153.44 10.61 6.9 182.65 5.8 
1977 114.88 11.38 9.9 210.76 5.4 
1978 101 • 21 11.12 10.9 220.14 5.1 
1979 114.73 14.00 12.2 217.76 6.4 
1980 291.52 18.00 6.2 210.04 8.6 
Sources: International Sugar Organization for the figures on the daily London 
price and the nominal freight and insurance costs; The Case of Sugar, 
op. cit., for the price of sugar from ACP countries 
a/ Prices in£ sterling per ton from 1972-1976 and in£ sterling per 
metric tonne from 1977-1980. 
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<tons> 
~fr:i£2 
Mauritius 609,744 
Zimbabwe 391,320 
Swaziland 368,485 
Kenya 350,000 
Sudan 230.000 
Malawi 177,323 
Ethiopia 170,122 
Ivory Coast 147,000 
Tanzania 121,727 
Madagascar 112,185 
Zambia 102,318 
Cameroun 66,483 
Zaire 60,000 
Somalia 50,000 
Senegal 37,439 
Upper Volta 30,000 
Chad 25,000 
Nigeria 25,000 
Guinea 22,000 
Congo 20,000 
Gabon 20,000 
Uganda 20,000 
Mali 9,426 
Ghana 7,000 
Rwanda 2,367 
£!r:i!2!2!!!:! 
Guyana 320,168 
Jamaica 204,010 
Belize 103,645 
Barbados 96,867 
Trinidad and Tobago 93,317 
St. Kitts (*) 33,135 
Surinam 8,000 
~!£ifi£ 
Fiji 487,508 
W. Samoa 3,000 
Source: International Sugar Organisation, London 
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